As the number, complexity and interaction of electrical, electronic and programmable electronic (E/E/PE) systems increase, a growing emphasis has been placed on the concept of functional safety during product development. IEC 61508 provides guidelines and standardized procedures in the development of reliable and dependable E/E/PE systems to assure functional safety. Determining risk classes (i.e., safety integrity levels, SILs) associated to a specific E/E/PE item may be recognized as one of the most crucial activities in the product development per IEC 61508 since SILs are used to specify necessary safety requirements for achieving an acceptable residual risk. This article presents a case study on the assessment of SILs applying failure modes, effects and diagnostic analysis (FMEDA) from which failure rates may be derived for each important failure category by combining a standard FMEA with online diagnostic techniques.
Introduction 1)
Compliance with the standard IEC 61508 becomes imperative in developing electrical, electronic and programmable electronic (E/E/PE) systems related to functional safety to cope with various safety related regulations with the increase of number, complexity and interaction of those systems. The standard covers all the relevant phases of development cycle (from initial concept, through design, implementation, operation and maintenance, to decommissioning) by providing guidelines for the design, verification and validation of safety related systems (SRSs) which implement the required safety functions necessary to achieve and maintain a state of Equipment Under Control (EUC). For each SRS, safety functions and their corresponding safety integrity levels (SILs) need to be specified. Representing a safety performance requirement for a system, the SIL is arranged in four distinct levels from SIL 1 to SIL 4, where SIL 4 is the highest with most stringent requirements. As a central concept of IEC 61508, safety integrity is defined as the probability of an SRS satisfactorily performing the required safety functions under all stated conditions within a specific period of time. (IEC 61508, 2010) A safety function is defined by two requirements : (1) the functional requirement describing what the 
safety function does and is derived from a hazard analysis and (2) the safety integrity requirement specifying the likelihood of the safety function being performed correctly (Glotzner, 2008) . If the risk inherent to a system exceeds an acceptable level, it is required to implement one or more safety functions to lower the actual risk to an acceptable level. Depending on the SIL to be achieved, appropriate measures and methods to be used are also described in the standard when implementing safety functions. Thus, a proper assessment of the SIL for SRSs is very important in applying IEC 61508. In this regard, the main objective of this study is to investigate a case example of the assessment of SILs applying failure modes, effects and diagnostic analysis (FMEDA) from which failure rates may be derived for each important failure category. FMEDA described in this article adopts the standard FMEA format from MIL-STD 1629A. Furthermore, MIL-HDBK 217F has been adopted for the purpose of reliability prediction since proof test data (i.e., field failure data) are not available for the product under study. It has been demonstrated that safe failure fraction (SFF) and other parameters necessary for the calculation of probability of failure on demand (PFD) may be obtained from FMEDA. The case study discussed here is based on the electrode type level gauge system which consists of two parts, micro process unit (MPU) and remote indicator unit (RIU). Depending on the proof-test intervals and operating conditions, the assessment of SILs has been conducted on the basis of PFDs obtained from FMEDA.
Key Concepts : SIL, SFF and PFD
The most important aspect of SRSs is to enhance the safety of the system itself by reducing potential inherent risk factors which can be done by reducing the PFDs. According to the standard IEC 61508, the SILs are defined as shown in <Table 1> depending on the PFD. A higher SIL means that a safer system can be achieved.
In terms of safety, system failures can be roughly divided into two categories: Safe and Dangerous Failures. Safe Failures mean those at the level of modules or subsystems inside the system. For these failures, the system can be migrated to the safe side through automatic diagnoses by the diagnostic function of the system. Failures in MPUs and RIUs correspond to this type of failure mode. On the other hand, Dangerous Failures mean, for example, that an error in operational processes inside an MPU cannot be found unless deviations in the relation between input and output signals is determined. In other words, even if an abnormality occurs inside the device, it appears to be working normally when viewed from outside. In such a case, the device continues to be used without stopping because the abnormality cannot be detected, which may lead to hazardous situation (Karou, 2005) . For this reason, the above two failure modes are again divided into detectable and undetectable elements, and safe failure fraction (SFF) can be determined on the failure rate of Dangerous Failure Undetected, the most dangerous element for safety. The calculation of SFF is given as follows : 
where   represents the proof-test interval. The average PFD for the system is simply the sum of the average PFD of each component. Based on the PFD calculations, one may now determine whether the SRS satisfies the requested levels of SIL. 
Reliability Prediction and FMEDA
The electrode type level gauge system consists of two parts: Micro Process Unit (MPU) and Remote Indicator Unit (RIU). An MPU receives 16 digital inputs from the sensor. Water level is divided into 16 levels from the bottom (0%) to the top (100%). If the water hits the pre-defined level, an RIU indicates the height in color out of 16-stepwise vertical bar. The device is turned on only if the water level changes, and the mode of operation is designated as 'low demand mode' from the past experience. A schematic drawing of the system is shown in <Figures 1>. The MPU has own display monitor and the RIU is usually placed in a remote site. The device is newly developed by the company, and thus the field failure data (i.e., proof-test data) are not available. The failure rates of individual components are estimated based on the Part Stress Method of reliability prediction described in MIL-HDBK 217F. As shown in <Appendix 1>, an important information for each part is provided in reliability prediction results such as category, brief description, quantity used, individual and overall failure rates along with reference number. For example, the part BEAD (2012) is a kind of bead coil with the resistance of 10 ohm and referred as L1 (i.e., reference number L1). It is used only once in an MPU and its failure rate is 0.4 FIT (Failure In Time, the number of failure that can be expected in 10 9 hours of operation). Proof-test has been conducted under two different temperature conditions, 30°C and 80°C. The outputs are transmitted to the RIU either by hardwire (4~ 20mA) or by RS-485 communication. If the transmission through hardwire fails, the alarm is annunciated and the RS-485 communication is turned on. Individual failure rates are calculated for the prooftest intervals of 1 month, 3 months, 6 months and 12 months. The MPU and RIU are consisted of 142 and 44 part components, respectively, and the failure rates for each component are obtained. These failure rate data may by used to estimate the failure rate of module or hardware block by each failure category in FMEDA. In addition to causes and effects for each failure mode, constituent parts of a component are listed in the table shown in Appendix 2. The overall failure rate of a component can be calculated as the sum of individual failure rates of constituent parts. Further the failure rate of a hardware block is simply the sum of individual failure rates of corresponding components. Considering safety assessment and detection method for each component, the failure category is determined.
For example, the hardware block 'Power' has two components, SMPS and Battery Charger. An SMPS is composed of 27 individual parts, including one ACDC motor (ACDC1), three diodes (U39, U40, D21), five coils (L3, L4, L5, LF1, LF2), four connector (CN1, SW6-2, SW6-3, SW6-4), one bead coil (LB1), and 13 capacitors (C132~C144). Adding up 27 individual failure rates from reliability prediction results, the failure rate of the component SMPS is found to be 3,524 FIT. Similarly, the component Battery Charger has 24 constituent parts, including four diodes (U41, D22, D23, D24), one relay (RY1), one transistor (Q6), one photo coupler (PC17), two capacitors (J10, C145), nine resistors (R210~R209), five connectors (SW100, SW101, SW102, SW105, SW6-1), and one battery (BT2). The failure rate of the component Battery Charger is simply the sum of failures rates of 24 individual parts which yields the failure rate of 508 FIT. Consequently, the failure rate of hardware block 'Power' is 4,032 FIT (= 3,524+ 508). Failures in 'Power' are classified as Dangerous Failure Detected through safety assessment resulting in   = 4,032 FIT for this hardware block. For each hardware block, the failure rates and their failure category are obtained in a similar way to construct the FMEDA table.
Results
Obtained from the FMEDA, failure rates by category are summarized in <Table 2> and <Table 3> for temperatures of 30°C and 80°C, respectively. It should be noted that failure rates remains the same without regard to proof-test interval and the SFF is calculated using equation (1). Based on the data of failure rate given in <Table 2> and <Table 3>, we may now calculate the PFDs at each temperature condition depending on proof-test intervals. The PFDs and corresponding SILs of the system is summarized in <Table 4> and <Table 5>. It should also be noted that the PFD for each part is calculated using equation (2) and the overall PFD is simply the sum of individual PFDs of MPU and RIU. For the case of temperature 30°C, the system has SIL 2 or SIL 3 depending on the proof-test intervals. For the case of temperature 80°C, on the other hand, the system has SIL 1 or SIL 2 depending on the prooftest intervals. It is intuitive that a higher SIL is assigned for a shorter proof-test interval with a given fixed failure rate since the calculated PFDs for a shorter intervals are lower.
Another important issue for SRSs is the operation records in the field. While the PFD is an important index used for actual SRS designs, MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) determined by taking the actual field failure records into account is also an important factor. The requirement for operational reliability reinforces the need for simplicity in SRS design and development. It should be carefully implemented for introducing design changes to improve the SIL since the operational reliability of the system may be affected by these changes. The above example, although relatively simple, demonstrates how IEC 61508 may be applied to a real application. Individual failure rates are first obtained, from which the required average PFD and hence the SIL of SRSs are derived. This case example discussed only the design of the SRS. It must be appreciated that the scope of IEC 61508 is much wider than this, and other requirements must be met in order to claim compliance.
Conclusion
The concept of functional safety has recently drawn a great deal of attention from practitioners in reliability and safety community. More specifically, the standard IEC 61508 provides guidelines and procedures in the development of reliable E/E/PE systems for functional safety. For a successful implementation of IEC 61508, a proper assessment of SIL is recognized as one of the most critical steps. This article presents a case study of SIL assessment based on FMEDA for an electrode type level gauge system. Failure rate prediction has first been carried based on MIL-HDBK 217F since the system is newly developed and thus field failure data are not available. The SFF and other parameters are derived to calculate PFDs.
It should be clear that the design of SRSs involves more than simply specifying subsystem components that are approved for use at the required SIL. The designer must demonstrate that the average PFD of the design as a whole meets the required SIL. For periodic proof tests, appropriate intervals must be selected since these intervals have a bearing on the average PFDs. This only applies to SRSs operating on low demand mode. For SRSs operating in continuous or high demand mode, the probability of dangerous failure per hour, PFH, is considered in place of the average PFD.
<Appendix 1> Reliability Prediction Based on MIL-HDBK 217F
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